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THE 2x2 MATRIX OF TORT
REFORM'S DISTRIBUTIONS
Anita Bernstein*
INTRODUCTION
From having lived, all persons know that predictability and unpre-
dictability each enhance our human existence and also oppress us.
We depend on predictability. Individuals and entities made up of
human beings-a wide category that includes institutions, businesses,
and societies-cannot flourish without schedules, routines, itineraries,
habits, ground rules, inferences derived from premises, and protocols
of engineering and design. Predictability makes trust and hope possi-
ble: human life without it would be an abyss of terror, despair, and
starvation. We would die if it disappeared.
Unpredictability, for its part, complements predictability. It lifts
our spirits, assuages our boredom, imparts wisdom, and (hand in hand
with predictability) generates economic profit. It is present in every
thrill we will ever live to feel.
The dichotomous contrast of these two abstract nouns does some of
the work of a related yet distinct juxtaposition: security and freedom.
Governments (especially in wealthy industrialized nations) often pur-
port to pursue both of those ends, undertaking to offer citizens both
security in the form of baseline entitlements and freedom through op-
portunities to attain more than mere shelter.' Freedom and security
constitute "the design and end of government," wrote the Founding
Father and pamphleteer Thomas Paine in Common Sense.2 An inter-
relation between the terms emerges through understanding "freedom
* Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I acknowledge with
thanks the stellar research assistance of Tyler Korff and very helpful comments from several
colleagues, including Gary Minda, Ted Janger, Bill Araiza, David Reiss, Adam Kobler, Law-
rence Solan, and Ursula Bentele. This Article received support from the Brooklyn faculty re-
search program and the Clifford team at the DePaul University College of Law, which Professor
Stephan Landsman has led to splendid achievements over many years.
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, extols both security and free-
dom. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHIs, G.A. Res. 217 (1ll) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(Ill), arts. 1, 3 (Dec. 10, 1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'l L. 127 (Supp. 1949).
2. TUOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENsi 5 (Stanley Appelbaum & Ronald Herder eds., Dover
Publ'ns 1997) (1776).
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as security from restraint . . . and security as freedom from
interference." 3
Like predictability and unpredictability, security and freedom are
desirable and urgently needed, but only in correct measures because
each has a dark side: security entails constraint, and freedom to act
can interfere with the interests of others.4 Too much security (or con-
straint) stifles while too little frightens. Too much freedom equals
danger; too little and we are chafed.5 John Stuart Mill wrote about
the tension: "[L]iberty is often granted where it should be withheld, as
well as withheld where it should be granted . . . ."6 Understood as
protection against the depredations of other people, constraint leads
to security and is thus legitimate when imposed by the state. Imman-
uel Kant, a philosopher preoccupied with freedom, felt it necessary (in
the name of "strict justice") to accept "the possibility of external coer-
cion that is compatible with the freedom of everyone in accordance
with universal laws."7 In recognition of this clash, writings in many
fields and disciplines within American law report efforts to strike a
balance between the two ends.8
3. Henry H. Foster, Jr., The Relation and Correlation of Freedom and Security, 58 W. VA. L.
REv. 325, 327 (1956).
4. See Jan Narveson, Equality vs. Liberty: Advantage, Liberty, in LIBwRTY AND EQUAorY 33
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1985).
5. Scott Adams of "Dilbert" fame took up the question on his blog:
Lately I've been wondering if freedom is a zero sum game. In other words, for one
person to get more freedom, someone else has to lose the same amount, but usually in
a different way.
I predict that you just reflexively rejected that concept, but your stubborness [sic]
won't stop me from unfolding the idea a bit more. To that end, only examples can help.
Example one: In order for me to be free to walk down the sidewalk, other people
must be prohibited from driving on them [sic].
Scott Adams, Freedom Is a Zero Sum Game, Sco'rr ADAMs BLOG (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.
dilbert.com/blog/entry/freedomisa azero-sum-game/. For a more nuanced treatment of this
point, see Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. Pot. Pint. 191
(2003) (arguing that security and freedom do not always struggle against each other in a zero-
sum relation and that the notion of balancing one against the other erroneously implies precision
about their relative quantity).
6. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 187 (5th ed. 1874).
7. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPIIYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 31-32 (John Ladd trans., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1798). John Rawls, building on Kant, expressed the balance between
security and freedom in what he called his first principle of justice: "[E]ach person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
scheme of liberties for others." JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (rev. ed. 1999).
8. See, e.g., JEFFRY RosIN, Ti NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SEcUR1rY AND FREEDOM IN
AN ANXious AGE 147 (2004) (surveying constitutional law on surveillance); Aharon Barak, A
Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 155
(2002) (commenting on human rights); Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade
Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INr'L ORG. 603, 606 (2000) (com-
menting on international trade law); Andrew Phang, Commercial Certainty, Mistake, Unconscio-
[Vol. 60:273274
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Observers of American tort rules have found the same inclination
in tort doctrine:9 as writers have noted, tort law advances-and also
mediates between-freedom and security.'0 Whenever "a person's
choices involve harm to others, interfering with the ability of those
other persons to exercise their own wills free from outside interfer-
ence," writes David Owen, tort law "has an important role to play in
defining and enforcing the boundaries between personal freedom of
action and personal security from harm."" Gregory Keating draws on
the work of John Rawls to describe this dialectic in terms of social
contract theory. Accident law, Keating explains, resolves "problems
of interpersonal risk imposition" by imposing what he calls "canons of
reasonableness."12 These canons, applied ex post, limit the preroga-
tive of an individual to impose risks on another person-driving too
fast to reach her destination, for example-in fulfillment of her own
wishes and life plans. In his jurisprudential writing on accident law,
Richard Wright examines the Aristotelian categories of distributive
justice and interactive justice, suggesting that they correspond respec-
tively to freedom and security: Distributive justice allots resources to
an individual so that she will have "an equal or sufficient opportunity
to fully realize her humanity as a self-legislating moral being," and
"[i]nteractive justice defines the scope of a person's negative free-
dom," which is "the security of her person and existing stock of re-
sources in interactions with others."13
This Article, which generalizes about broad-scale distributive ef-
fects that have followed past revisions to accident law in the United
States and will accompany any reforms installed in the future,14 di-
nobility and Implied Terms, 1 J. OBLIGATIONs & REMEDIEs 21, 26 (2002) (commenting on
commercial law).
9. Throughout this Article-and consistent with a pattern in Clifford-sponsored scholarship in
this journal-reference to torts, tort doctrine, and tort liability will generally have in mind per-
sonal injury torts rather than torts involving harms to finances or physical property.
10. See Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HAiiv. L. REv. 72, 73 (1942) (noting "the
two basic interests of individuals-the interest in security and the interest in freedom of action").
For an update on the point, see Anita Bernstein, The Communities That Make Standards of Care
Possible, 77 Ctn.-KEN-r L. REV. 735, 736 n.5 (2002) (gathering citations to works by Jules L.
Coleman, John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Stephen G. Gilles, and Gregory C.
Keating).
11. David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 719-20 (1992).
12. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 311, 323-24 (1996).
13. Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 143,
165-66 (2002); see also Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in PIntosoIllICAI
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 159, 167-68 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
14. Here I continue work pursued in Anita Bernstein, Distributive Justice Through Tort (and
Why Sociolegal Scholars Should Care), 35 LAw & Soc. INoUIRY 1099 (2010). This Article uses
"tort reform" consistent with the vernacular meaning-new liability-constricting rules-but the
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vides advocates of changes to tort rules into two groups: pro-plaintiff
and pro-defendant. I have acknowledged that the dichotomy is
crude.' 5 It may displease writers who have argued for new doctrines
while situating themselves outside any partisan division.'6 Some par-
tisans have suggested that although a reductive label might suit their
opponents, it certainly misdescribes them.' 7 Contemporary discus-
sions about tort reform, however, will usually situate participants in
either the pro or contra camp. The yes-or-no question dividing the
two stances-whether liability for personal injury in the United States
is too great and whether it needs to be curbed-sets up a line clear
and meaningful enough to be useful, if reductive.
From here I consider how the two camps pursue security and free-
dom for themselves by advocating particular changes to American tort
law. Because the cohorts oppose each other in a binary and need sup-
port beyond their own membership, they find it expedient to cloak
their wishes in more neutral-sounding rhetoric. Both sides have in-
voked predictability and unpredictability, the theme of this year's Clif-
ford Symposium. They do not equate security with predictability and
unpredictability with freedom; the words are overlapping rather than
synonymous.' 8
The combination of two cohorts (plaintiff and defendant) and two
contrasting nouns (unpredictability and predictability) that the two
cohorts pursue yields a double binary, and from there a 2x2 matrix.
This type of display has been useful to the literature on several binary
phrase in the title includes new liability-expanding rules, see infra Part II, as well. For an early
usage of "tort reform" to mean pro-plaintiff change, see Dian Dickson Ogilvie, Comment, Judi-
cial Activism in Tort Reform: The Guest Statute Exemplar and a Proposal for Comparative Negli-
gence, 21 UCLA L. REv. 1566 (1974).
15. See Anita Bernstein, Teaching Torts: Rivalry as Pedagogy, 18 ToRrs L.J. 187, 196 (2010);
see also Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2005)
(arguing that successful deployments of the Due Process Clause to challenge tort rules have
rendered obsolete the old "dynamic of pro-plaintiff expansion" versus "pro-defendant contrac-
tion"). Hewing to the old-school divide, this Article makes few references to Fourteenth
Amendment torts jurisprudence.
16. I have in mind scholars like Stephen Sugarman, Geoffrey Palmer, and Jeffrey O'Connell.
17. For example, some tort reformers label themselves and their ideas as "common sense"
rather than tort reform. See Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort
Reform, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1765, 1769-70 (1996). And the best-known group of plaintiffs'-side
activists changed its familiar name, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, to the more
statesmanlike American Association for Justice.
18. "Freedom" and "unpredictability," for example, are far from synonyms of each other,
even though descriptors like "free spirit" and "free-wheeling" connote a disinclination to behave
in a predictable manner. Predictability and unpredictability each can generate-and can also
undermine-both security and freedom.
[Vol. 60:273276
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sets of wishes and results that the law influences.19 My central point,
amenable to a 2x2 layout, is that advocates of changes to tort doctrine
and procedure on both sides have invoked predictability and unpre-
dictability to attain the freedom and security they want. 20 Observers
of their efforts who lack a direct stake in their proposals-including
legislators, judges, and the public-should remember that these refer-
ences to predictability and unpredictability are instruments rather
than ends in themselves.21
Let us put plaintiff- and defendant-favoring stances on one axis and
unpredictability/predictability on the other. Figure 1 starts with four
stances vis-A-vis tort liability in the bounded spaces of the matrix. De-
spite the longstanding linkage of contemporary tort reform with the
quest for more predictability, it turns out that both sides of this battle
pursue both more and less of this quality within a liability regime:
19. See DOUGiLAS G. BAIiRD, ROBEw H. GERTNE-R & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
ANDi THE LAw 5, 10 (1994) (offering an overview of game theory in legal scholarship and explain-
ing matrices and bimatrices); see also Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of
International Securities Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT't L. 61, 65 (1999) (arguing that several 2x2
matrices, not just the Prisoner's Dilemma, inform analysis of international cooperation in the
securities markets); Phil, The Best 2x2 Matrix of All Time?, TRANSCEND STRATEGY BLOG (Mar.
15, 2010), http://www.transcendstrategy.com/?p=773 (quoting management guru Stephen Covey:
"Important questions always get reduced to two options."). For a warning in the context of
another 2x2 matrix about treating defendants and plaintiffs as symmetrically situated, see Lee
Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1415-17 (2007) (noting that plain-
tiffs can engage in self-help to mitigate the harms of permitting a risky activity, but defendants
cannot engage in self-help to mitigate the harms of banning it).
20. Which is not to say that desires about predictability are or should be limited to advocates.
Deborah Hensler has observed that if predictability in tort adjudication utterly disintegrates,
then the public suffers, because deterrence becomes impossible. See So Sue Me: Tort Reform
(Hoover Institution television broadcast Nov. 16, 2000), transcript available at http://www.hoo-
ver.org/multimedia/uk/3376311.html ("Why should we care about unpredictability? The reason
the general public should care about unpredictability is that if the system is perceived by . . .
potential wrong-doers . . . to be unpredictable then the decision-makers in those companies will
stop paying attention to the liability system." (quoting Deborah Hensler)).
21. Guided by Justice Souter's opinion for the Court in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S.
471 (2008), in this Article I exempt punitive damage reform from discussions of predictability
and unpredictability within tort reform. Unpredictability in punitive damage awards may indeed
be "in tension with the function of [these] awards as punitive, just because of the implication of
unfairness that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries in a system whose commonly held
notion of law rests on a sense of fairness in dealing with one another," id. at 502, and thus
unacceptable for non-instrumentalist reasons.
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FIGURE 1: EXAMPLES OF APPROACHES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
TORT LIABILITY
Varied tort reform Belief that the less liability
initiatives at the state and the better
federal level, addressed
Pro-Defendant toward legislatures and
the public, which achieve
varying degrees of
acceptance
Formation of new causes Opposition to particular
of action immunities, limited-duty
rules, and other rules of
law that take issues away
- P tfrom the fact-finder and
put tort adjudication more
homogenously in the
hands of juries
Low High
PREDICTABILITY
The upper right quadrant takes pro-defendant tort reformers most
literally at their word: the cohort wants predictability in the form of
no-liability rules. The upper left quadrant, however, notes that the
cohort abandons its devotion to predictability when it can obtain epi-
sodic instances of favorable doctrine instead. State-by-state efforts
necessarily diminish predictability, at least in the short and medium
term. The lower rows of the matrix argue that pro-plaintiff changes to
tort liability rules can enhance predictability as well as diminish it.
Another illustration of the same point emerges from posing a hypo-
thetical question to both camps: "With respect to your interests, what
is the ideal doctrine of liability?" 22 By hypothesis, the plaintiff wants
tort claims to succeed while the defendant side wants them to fail,
suggesting that the sectors will vote for absolute liability and immu-
nity, respectively. Absolute liability and immunity may both be seen
as high-predictability desiderata. They both, of course, are incompati-
ble with each other. In the face of resistance from the other camp,
each side has its low-predictability goal to pursue:
22. I thank Ted Janger for suggesting this iteration of the matrix.
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FIGURE 2:
Pro-Defendant
Pro-Plaintiff
PREFERRED IDEAL-TYPE REGIME FOR
ACCIDENT LIABILITY
Heightened pleading Immunity
rules; understanding
negligence as gross
negligence
Negligence Absolute liability
Low High
PREDICTABILITY
For yet another take on the point, one can use the 2x2 matrix to lay
out larger quests of both cohorts in the partisanship axis. Activists
identified with both the pro-plaintiff and the pro-defendant sides have
sought changes to the law of torts that make the groups' encounters
with civil justice both more and less predictable for themselves. Fig-
ure 3 mentions four desires that the cohorts hold, two by the plaintiffs'
side and two by the defendants' side. Half of them seek more predict-
ability and half seek less:
FIGURE 3: TORT UNPREDICTABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY AS
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS DESIRE THEM
Pro-Defendant
Pro-Plaintiff
Low High
PREDICTABILITY
r.i~
2:
2:
Entrepreneurial Insulation from liability
opportunity;
lack of regulatory
constraint
Chance to sway a jury; Expansions of liability
"the lawsuit lottery"'23 that alter behavior in a
risk-reducing direction
23. JFFFREY O'CONNEUl-, Tm LAwsurr LorrERY (1979). For my thoughts on this phrase, see
Bernstein, supra note 10, at 736 ("Those of us who like to describe American negligence law as a
'lottery' may have a better-than-typical understanding of the low ratio of winners to losers that
the system creates.").
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Iterations of the matrix warn onlookers not to take partisan calls for
more predictability at face value. Proponents desire something else at
least some of the time; they must, because they have also manifested a
taste for unpredictability. What these advocates really seek when they
press for predictability, I contend in this Article, is more security for
themselves in the form of curbing the prerogatives and opportunities
of actors who hold interests contrary to their own. At the same time,
they want freedom. I intend no disparagement of this agenda: as far
as I know, it is normal and universal. All human beings crave shelter
from adverse contingencies. They hope to constrain those who would
vex them. The security they want includes being spared cost internal-
ization, or what would to them come across as maintaining their free-
dom of action. With respect to their own behavior, they have no use
for predictability.
It follows-or at least I shall argue-that neither side in this battle-
ground will confine its activism to seeking predictability as such.
Rhetoric notwithstanding, what the tort reform movement now pur-
sues is security and freedom for its membership; and its predecessors in
rule-revision, the tort expansionists who wrote new law in the mid-
twentieth century, also wanted security and freedom, albeit for differ-
ent recipients: consumers and other potential plaintiffs rather than
business interests. With this discussion, I hope to pry predictability
out of the hands of one cohort. It does not belong only to the defense
side. Separated from its partisan usage, predictability becomes more
interesting and more informative.
The three Parts of this Article follow a structure of thesis followed
by antithesis followed by synthesis.2 4 Part II examines tort liability as
a source of security and freedom for persons vulnerable to injury, the
group from which plaintiffs are drawn. 25 Like all persons, this cohort
desires both predictability and unpredictability; the tort liability re-
gime gives them some of both. Part III undertakes a complementary
analysis of the security, freedom, predictability, and unpredictability
constituents of the matrix, with reference to American tort reform as
undertaken beginning in the late 1970s, 26 to match the discussion of
24. For recent examples of this structure as used to analyze legal doctrine, see generally Anita
Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations = Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex, 62 FLA. L. Riv.
895 (2010) (reviewing the academic literature on "broken windows," a law enforcement device);
A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 Geo. WAsh. L. RJev. 353, 367
(2010) (contrasting the thesis of liability with the antithesis of restriction in civil procedure).
25. See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
26. I simplify American tort history by situating expansion of tort liability in the middle of the
twentieth century with contraction arriving a couple of decades later. On what these time peri-
ods represent, see generally STEPHANIE MENCIMER, BLOCKING THE COURrlousie Doo: How
[Vol. 60:273280
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tort liability in Part II.27 Committed to reversing the expansions of
liability for accidents that had taken hold in the middle of the twenti-
eth century, tort reform offers an antithesis to the liability thesis.
Readers familiar with the tort reform debate will recognize the ref-
erences to predictability and unpredictability in this context because
the reform movement has deemed these abstractions so central to its
cause.28 Part III refuses to hew to tort-reform rhetoric about the per-
ils of unpredictability, however. Its 2x2 discussion widens the base
that the tort reform movement has used. Part IV, the final substantive
part of this Article, brings together the two opposing sets of conten-
tions about security, freedom, predictability, and unpredictability into
a synthesis that invites other reform proposals into consideration.29 I
discuss three of them: health insurance, administrative regulation,
and workers' compensation.
II. SECURITY AND FREEDOM THROUGH EXPANDED LIABILITY FOR
ACCIDENTAL HARM
A. Seeking Unpredictability
Before the expansion of liability that took off in the middle of the
twentieth century in the United States, tort law enforced predictability
through doctrines that limited defendants' responsibility for acci-
dents.30 Privity, for example, insulated product manufacturers from
liability to remote purchasers and bystanders. Immunities protected
charities and family members from having to pay for the harm that
their carelessness caused. Medical negligence claims, no matter how
compelling, could not reach a jury without plaintiff-favoring testimony
from a physician in the community.
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND ITS CORPORATE ALLIES ARE TAKING AWAY YOUR RIGI rTO
SUE 13 (2006) (identifying defense-focused tort reform as originating not in the late 1970s but in
a 1950s "PR campaign"); Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle over Tort Reform and the Overlooked
Legacy of the Progressives, 39 AKRON L. REV. 943 (2006) (arguing that arguments about both
expansion and retraction of tort liability were well developed in the Progressive era, which began
in the late nineteenth century). The chronology followed in this Article-expansion efforts first,
narrowing second-is historically accurate enough. See id. at 960-68 (reviewing Progressive-era
debates); see also John Fabian Witt, Lessons from History: State Constitutions, American Tort
Law, and the Medical Malpractice Crisis 31-43 (Pew Project report 2004) (discussing instances
of resistance to progressive tort legislation in the early twentieth century).
27. See infra notes 44-77 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part IlIl.A.
29. See infra notes 78-143 and accompanying text.
30. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2002)
(referring to "[t]he [I]aissez [flaire [niegligence [e]ra" of 1825 to 1944).
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Some doctrines functioned (and continue to function) to keep de-
fendant-favoring predictability dominant or probable, rather than in-
stall it absolutely. Requiring a plaintiff to prove fault-the
nineteenth-century judicial maneuver announced in Brown v.
Kendall3 -impeded the prosecution of a tort claim but did not stop it.
Juries enjoyed some flexibility to side with plaintiffs on questions of
proximate cause and to reject immunizing defenses like assumption of
risk and contributory negligence.32 The stance against redress for
harm that was only economic or emotional also had its fissures. In
general, however, broad rules covering duty, breach, proximate cause,
and defenses made liability exposure more predictable for persons
and entities whose work or business operations, along with their
wealth, made them attractive defendants. What Morton Horwitz fa-
mously described as a subsidy to industry delivered in the form of
doctrinal change 33 went well beyond allowing heedless actors to keep
their cash. Favorable rules enhanced the predictability of not only the
actuarial fact of having to pay out judgments in the future but also
businesses' stores of publicity. Doctrine gave them a tighter grip on
publicity, reputation, and the privacy (or secrecy) of their records.
Lawyers, judges, and scholars who worked to undo defense-favor-
ing doctrines at the same time undid predictability. They did not at-
tack predictability as an ill; instead they diminished it incidentally to
their goal of enlarging redress for injured persons. Consider the
changes in one state, California, the jurisdiction that "led the way in
carving out new categories of plaintiff recovery in nearly every corner
of tort law." 34 Tort revision in this jurisdiction included more gener-
ous damages rules, expansions of existing compensatory damages pro-
visions, retreats from older no-duty precepts, increased responsibility
for misbehaviors of third parties, extensions of proximate cause, and
easier ways to hold co-defendants responsible for injury. Disparate
labels like these all have unpredictability in common: courts and juries
gained new powers to favor plaintiffs, but these institutional actors
could also choose not to exercise their prerogative.
One view attributed to the tort reform movement-an aversion to
juries because, inter alia, juries make tort outcomes "either wholly un-
31. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
32. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal,
87 YAi L.J. 697 (1978).
33. MoRTON J. HoRwrrz, Timn TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 99-100
(1977).
34. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 30, at 45.
[Vol. 60:273282
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predictable or else predictably pro-plaintiff" 35-summarizes what pro-
plaintiff activists wanted and achieved during the expansionary era.
Rewriting doctrine in this direction made results "predictably pro-
plaintiff" in the aggregate. Individual plaintiffs gained the opportu-
nity of unpredictability: They received better odds of winning, but
they could also lose.
B. At the Same Time, Seeking Predictability
Mid-century expansionists who pursued the unpredictable chance to
gain more redress for plaintiffs also wanted predictability in the form
of new doctrinal categories. They did not present themselves as ban-
dits roving to grab money or gamblers who liked the odds in the great
jury casino. Elsewhere, describing a portion of their successes, I have
presented these efforts as historically most likely to succeed when
they appeared conservative, incrementalist, or emergent from existing
common law rules rather than innovative. 36
Judge-made expansions of tort remedies usually took care to invoke
precedents. Even decisions that went boldly where no American
court had gone before-for example Rowland v. Christian, which
merged the three common law classifications of land visitors;37 Pro-
canik v. Cillo, which found a cause of action for wrongful life;38 and
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, which declared market share liabil-
ity 39-labored to present their holdings as consistent with an evolving
expansion. Expansionist case law tells readers not to be surprised by
the decision of the court. The outcome, according to each judicial au-
thor, was predictable.
For injured plaintiffs and their counsel, tort shifts that have the ef-
fect of making compensation available to injured people seem consis-
tent with predictability. They do not equate liability with runaway
juries and other tropes that call tort-claiming unpredictable. To them,
a chance to be heard and compensated is predictable, whereas anti-
plaintiff doctrines like limited-duty rules, statutes of limitation, and
all-or-nothing plaintiff's-conduct defenses are unpredictable-bi-
zarrely formalist, that is, or artificial. The reality of their own injury
and what they deem the responsibility of the defendant to pay for this
35. Stephen D. Sugarman, United States Tort Reform Wars, 25 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 849, 849
(2002) (suggesting also that "unpredictability actually helps to keep management on its toes").
36. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1539,
1565 (1997).
37. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968).
38. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 757 (N.J. 1984).
39. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980).
2011] 283
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harm suffice, in their opinion, to justify an entry of judgment in their
favor. Withholding redress would be unpredictable to them.
Making policy in a more disinterested fashion, tort expansionists in
the middle of the twentieth century took note of the virtues that pre-
dictability offered.4 0 In the 1956 edition of their torts treatise, Fowler
Harper and Fleming James defended liability as a source of insurance
by arguing that it eased the consequences of "ruinous loss" and "great
financial shock." 41 Roger Traynor offered a predictability rationale
for strict products liability when he declared that case outcomes
should not rest on the vagaries of compliance vel non with Sales Act
notice rules, a condition that varies flukishly from plaintiff to plain-
tiff.4 2 Although today they tend to cede ownership of the predictabil-
ity goal to their opponents, pro-plaintiff activists occasionally pick up
the predictability cue.43
III. SECURITY AND FREEDOM THROUGH TORT REFORM
INITIATIVES ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS
Seeking both shelter and prerogatives for business, the tort reform
movement has denounced liability for accidents as ruinously unpre-
dictable. Yet just as the expansionist efforts noted in the last Part pur-
sued both unpredictability and predictability, this constituency has
desires with respect to predictability that are varied rather than uni-
tary. Here, reversing the order of presentation in Part II, we may start
with calls for more predictability and then look at the taste for less of
it.
A. Praising Predictability
Predictability has long occupied the heart of tort reform initia-
tives.4" The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) puts the
40. Here I briefly summarize a review of sources that I explored years ago at greater length.
See Anita Bernstein, A Model of Products Liability Reform, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 637, 646-47
(1993).
41. 2 FowL-ER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., TiHE LAW OF- TORTs 763 n.7 (1956).
42. Bernstein, supra note 40, at 646 (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d
897, 901 (Cal. 1963)).
43. For example, in 2003, a coalition of more than a hundred public interest organizations
proposed to make the supply of insurance more predictable by funding "a standby public in-
surer" that could provide coverage during bottom periods of insurance investment-and-risk-writ-
ing cycles. Sarah Norland, Seeking Shelter from Rising Malpractice Costs, J. HEALTHCARE FIN.
MGMr, Nov. 2003, at 58, 63, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/health-care-social-assistance/
688079-1.html.
44. See Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure
Economic Loss, 48 ARiZ. L. REv. 773, 805 (2006) (claiming that defense-side tort reformers
"wax endlessly about unpredictability").
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word in the center of its slogan: "Bringing Greater Fairness, Predict-
ability and Efficiency to the Civil Justice System." 4 5  ATRA de-
nounces unpredictability in the form of "[m]eritless cases settled
because defendants fear the outcome of an emotion-filled jury trial or
a lawless court."4 6 In an amicus brief that defended a statutory cap on
damages, one Southern governor described his state back in the bad
old pre-reform days as a "judicial hellhole" where unpredictability
had run wild.4 7 Nonpartisan academic commentary on the tort reform
movement identifies the stated quest for more predictability as foun-
dational. 48 Like the constraints on liability that expansionists had at-
tacked in decades past, the constraints that contemporary tort
reformers have pursued alter predictability to varying degrees.
The best kind of predictability for a defendant is immunity.49 Here
the biggest contemporary tort reform success has been the federal ban
on lawsuits against handgun manufacturers for injuries attributable to
criminal violence.50 Almost as successful, the Personal Responsibility
in Food Consumption Act, written to ban claims against sellers of fast
food for harms related to obesity,5' won passage in the House of Rep-
resentatives. 52 As federal legislation, this bill appears dead at the mo-
ment, but about half the states have banned this negligence claim in
45. AMERICAN TORT RiFoRM AssoCIATION, http://www.atra.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
46. AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION: AT A GLANCE, http://www.atra.orglabout (last
visited Feb. 11, 2011) (quoting ATRA president Sherman Joyce). On the "emotion-filled jury
trial" as potentially favorable to defendants as well as plaintiffs, see Anita Bernstein, Fellow-
Feeling and Gender in the Law of Personal Injury, 18 J.L. & Po 'v 295, 297-98 (2009).
47. See Brief for Governor Haley Barbour as Amicus Curiae Supporting Cross-Appellee,
Double Quick Inc. v. Lymas, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 489 (Sept. 23,2010) (No. 2008-CA-01713), avail-
able at http://www.governorbarbour.com/news/2009/dec/DQbrief.pdf. According to Governor
Barbour, unpredictability applied not only to jury awards but to litigants' connections to Missis-
sippi itself. Id. The state's version of long-arm jurisdiction permits filings against defendants
that do not do business in Mississippi. See MENCIMER, supra note 26, at 118-19. Tort-reform
critic Stephanie Mencimer has noted the origins of this quirky statutory rule of personal jurisdic-
tion: after television actors from the Bonanza show refused to perform at the Mississippi State
Fair in 1964 when they learned the audience would be whites only, the legislature changed the
long-arm statute so that the performance contract could be enforced in Mississippi. Id.
48. See KENNE7TII S. ABRAHAM, TIHE FORMS AN) FUNCTIONS OF1 TORT LAw 239 (2d ed. 2002);
Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine
Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CArII. L. Rizv. 773, 776 (1995) (noting that tort
reformers have focused on noneconomic damages like pain and suffering because these awards
are "subjective, unpredictable, and substantial").
49. See supra Figure 2.
50. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095
(2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903 (2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2006)).
51. See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005).
52. Joan R. Rothenberg, In Search of the Silver Bullet: Regulatory Models to Address Child-
hood Obesity, 65 FooD & DRUG L.J. 185, 206 (2010).
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their courts.53 State courts have cooperated; no plaintiff has gained a
judgment of damages for excessive fast-food consumption. 54 The doc-
trine of preemption also advances the immunity version of
predictability. 55
Many state-level reforms have won passage with the help of predict-
ability rationales; at a minimum, these reforms have in common the
trait of constraining jury prerogative, a condition that the tort reform
movement associates with unpredictability.56 Caps on damages, so
cherished by the just-mentioned governor of Mississippi, enhance pre-
dictability by pressing a range of adverse outcomes that juries might
have priced divergently into a relatively narrow dollar metric. The
abolition of joint liability reassures well-heeled tortfeasors that their
liability exposure will be limited to the relatively predictable share of
responsibility that fact-finders will ascribe to them. Pretrial screening
panels bring uniformity to the docket. Statutes of limitation and re-
pose add predictability at a temporal level.
Tort reformers have focused on categories of products and services
that they deem vulnerable to the unpredictable ravages of liability.
Vaccines, contraceptives, and obstetrics have filled a large tort-reform
literature for decades.57 More recent writings continue to link liabil-
53. Id.
54. Accordingly, a section in a law review note captioned "Can Litigation Work to Fight
Obesity? Limited Empirical Evidence For and Against Obesity Litigation" takes the defeat of
individual plaintiffs' claims as very likely, if not certain, and then considers whether litigation as
macro-strategy can improve this particular social condition. Ashley B. Antler, Note, The Role of
Litigation in Combating Obesity Among Poor Urban Minority Youth: A Critical Analysis of
Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 15 CARoozo J.L. & GENDEi 275, 295-98 (2009).
55. See Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOR-
FST L. Rvv. 1075,1119 (1996) (describing "preemption as an immunity from responsibility"); see
also infra Part IV.B (discussing administrative regulation in terms of how strongly it functions to
stop tort claims).
56. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Sixteenth Annual Clifford Symposium,
The Limits of Predictability and the Value of Uncertainty, available at http://www.law.depaul.
edu/clifford/ [hereinafter Clifford Symposium]. For elaboration by writers not associated with
either side of the tort reform movement, see, for example, Lee Harris, Tort Reform as Carrot-
and-Stick, 46 HARV. I. ON LEIs. 163, 201 (2009) (noting the difficulty of pricing insurance to
cover future jury awards, which are hard to predict); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A The-
ory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELj L. Riav. 239, 288 (2009) (review-
ing studies and claims about awards of punitive damages).
57. See Brown v. Superior Court of S.F., 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) (linking expansive tort
liability with reduction in the supply of vaccines); PETER W. HUBER, LIAnn1i.rry: T11i7 LEGAL
RiVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCFs 140, 230 (1988) (protesting that "tort law has made vacci-
nation at best a profitless activity"); id. at 140 (linking liability to the withdrawal of contracep-
tives from the market); id, at 162 (stating that "[olbstetricians and gynecologists have retreated
too"); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Problems and Solutions in Medical Malpractice: Comments on
Chapters Six and Seven, in TiHE LIAIITrY MAZE: TIE IMPACT OF1 LIABIITY LAW ON SAFETY
AND INNovATION 274, 274 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (evaluating the effect
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ity, unpredictability, and the loss of social goods that enhance public
health.58 As summed up concisely by a leading authority on pharma-
ceutical liability, the stakes that tort reformers emphasize are first,
"innovation," and second, "patient access" to health-fostering tech-
nologies.59 Predictability in the form of reduced liability exposure, ac-
cording to this view, enhances a valuable supply.
B. Praising Unpredictability
Tort reformers reliably denounce the unpredictable results of jury-
oriented adjudication and even more reliably reach for the odd,
quirky horror story (rather than quantitative data) to support their
generalizations about liability. 60 Professor Benjamin Barton has
found it "interesting just how much of the tort reform argument is
built on anecdote" given that unpredictability is "one of the tort re-
formers' most persuasive arguments against our current system."6 1
Tort reformers seem drawn to the freshness and startle-value of sto-
ries. They tell tales about spilled coffee and a CAT scan that allegedly
took away psychic powers much more often than, for example, they
report a longitudinal decline in the supply of services or products.
of medical malpractice liability on the supply of medical care); Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Ef-
fect of Product Liability on New Drug Development, in TiHE LIABILITY MAZE, supra, at 334, 337
(decrying "the unpredictability of litigation," which threatens "financial catastrophe for the
manufacturer").
58. See James B. Currier, Too Sick, Too Soon?: The Causation Burden Under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Following De Bazan v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 19 FEDo. CIR. B.J. 229, 233 (2009); James M. Wood et al., Product Liability Protection
for Stem Cell Research and Therapies - A Proposal, 18 HIEAITi LAw., Oct. 2005, at 1, 13 (advo-
cating the creation of a compensation scheme, preempting tort liability, for injuries ascribed to
stem cell interventions); Angela Marino, Note, The Cost of a Countermeasure: The Expansive
Liability Protection of the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of2005,20 U. FLA.
J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 199, 202 (2009) ("[P]roducts liability lawsuits against pharmaceutical manu-
facturers have historically created inconsistent, threatening legal precedents.").
59. Lars Noah, Platitudes About "Product Stewardship" in Torts: Continuing Drug Research
and Education, 15 Mici-. Ti-Li-comm. & TiECH. L. Raiv. 359, 359 (2009).
60. See MENCIMER, supra note 26, at 11-32 (reviewing the most repeated anecdotes in a chap-
ter called "Too Good to Check: Media Myths about the Civil Justice System"); Marc Galanter,
An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. Re7v.
717, 725-34 (1998) (summarizing "legends" and their uses).
61. Benjamin H. Barton, Tort Reform, Innovation, and Playground Design, 58 FLA. L. REV.
265, 276 n.44 (2006). Tort reformers do use some data in their advocacy. For example, Paul
Rubin, an economist allied with the movement, has linked the constricting of liability with some
safety effects. See PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRAcr 58-71 (1993); Paul H. Rubin
& Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221, 235 (2007). A
study highlighted by the American Tort Reform Association found a correlation between limits
on the size of medical malpractice awards and the supply of physicians. AMERICAN TORT RE-
iFORM AssoCIATION: How TORT RmFORM WORKS, http://www.atra.org/wrap/files.cgil7964-how-
works.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
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Predictably, courts that review outlandish claims will deny recov-
ery;6 2 but anecdotes make an effective point about the uses of bizarre
assertions. Even if plaintiffs' accusations will ultimately fail, their ex-
istence reveals a problem. A reputable economic actor offering a
product or service ought not to face pleadings like these. Professor
Barton concedes that persons who populate juries might fall for "sob
stories."63 The anecdote method of transferring wealth in unpredict-
able spurts has indeed paid off for a few plaintiffs. Barton speculates
that tort reformers have been seduced by the triumphs of unpredict-
ability on the other side of the caption and so have embraced unpre-
dictability for themselves."
Another tendentious use of unpredictability in tort reform rhetoric
is enthusiasm for innovation, a good thing said to be hobbled by liabil-
ity. 6 5 According to this position, contraceptives, vaccines, and small
airplanes in particular now take inferior and limited forms because
liability risks are discouraging innovative would-be suppliers from
bringing new products to the market. 66 In an influential early article,
Peter Huber noted a heuristic that functions to discourage innovation:
judges and jurors regard old, familiar things and technologies as safe,
whereas novelty and unfamiliarity connote peril to them. 6 7 Not only
is innovation inherently unpredictable, but the relation between liabil-
ity and innovation also defies prediction, as Professor Barton shows in
his study of one particular category:
Tort reformers tell a very simple playground design story. Kids
loved seesaws and the traditional playground. Despite the children,
evil plaintiffs' lawyers and nanny-staters have stripped playgrounds
of their equipment and have diluted and wimpified the national
identity. I want to tell the opposite story: The old playgrounds were
62. See Mi.NcIMjEiR, supra note 26, at 139-40 (describing judicial responses to frivolous con-
tentions by plaintiffs); Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter
Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. Riv. 183, 190 (1992) (noting that trial and appellate judges generally
overturn outrageous plaintiffs' verdicts).
63. Barton, supra note 61, at 276 n.44.
64. "Years of struggling against the current tort system seem to have subconsciously imprinted
the system itself on the critics," writes Barton, apropos of anecdata rather than data fueling the
tort reform movement. Id. "By analogy, consider George Foreman's transformation from an
angry, glowering heavyweight before fighting Muhammad Ali, to the almost goofy personality
that emerged years later. It was as if Ali beat his own personality into Foreman." Id.
65. See HUBER, supra note 57, at 155; MICIAni. E. PORTER, Ti CoMPEjTITVE ADVANTAGE
OF- NATIONs 649 (1990); Barton, supra note 61, at 269 & n.18 (citing writings by tort reformers);
Noah, supra note 59, at 359; Kara Sissell, Study Tallies Tort Litigation's Effect on Innovation,
CHEM. WEEK, Apr. 4, 2007, at 43.
66. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
67. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 Cot-um. L. REV. 277, 278 (1985).
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unfun deathtraps that have been thankfully replaced by immensely
more amusing and safer playgrounds. 68
In other words, playground innovation thrived under the constraint
of liability, and so the tort reform contention about liability as chafing
is refuted by experience literally on the ground. But if liability does
limit innovation, as tort reformers have contended, and therefore is a
bad thing, then tort reformers who would constrain liability for the
sake of protecting innovation cannot be devoted to predictability. To
innovate is to create the unpredictable. Creating something predict-
able may make other contributions, but it is not an innovation.
Another enthusiasm for unpredictability found in the tort reform
movement is an enthusiasm for markets in products and services. The
tort reform complaint that liability has disadvantaged American prod-
uct sellers in international competition69 rests on a premise that suc-
cess in this venue is desirable; tort reformers never recommend that
sellers cut their losses by withdrawing from competitive markets. A
study undertaken for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce investigated
how "the threat of lawsuits" impedes small business, a sector cher-
ished for its power to build national wealth.70 Like innovation, all
market economies (at least the ones that deliver goods beyond a basic
subsistence level) necessarily deal in the unpredictable. Profits, price
shifts, new financial instruments, the pursuit of diversified investment
portfolios, and almost every other mainstay of modern markets would
not exist if unpredictability did not exist.7'
68. Barton, supra note 61, at 290.
69. See, e.g., A REPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETrIVENEss, AENI)A
FoR Civit JUSTICE RFiOiRM IN AMERICA 1-3 (1991) (reporting views on tort reform of the first
Bush Administration); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Im-
pact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9
J.L. & COM. 167, 180 (1989).
70. U.S. CH1AMB3ER INSTrTITE r FOR LI.EGAL REFORM, SMAu. BUSINE-SiS: How THE THREAT
or LAwsurrs IMPAcrs THEIR OPERATIONS (2007), available at http://www.instituteforlegalre-
form.com/component/ilrissues/29.html.
71. Consider, for example, the centrality of unpredictability and predictability in proposals to
reform sectors of the American national economy. Shortly before his death, the noted deregu-
lator Alfred Kahn, who brought price competition to American civil aviation, ridiculed the re-
gime he had displaced for the predictable prices and customer service it imposed on the airline
industry, a guarantee of profits for which consumers had to pay. Alfred E. Kahn, Airline Com-
petition Has Rewards, ITHACA J., Mar. 18, 2010, at 13A. See also Ray Waldron, Op-Ed., Bush
Social Security Plan Isn't Sound, Sr. CoUD TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at 7B (observing that unpre-
dictability is both "[t]he upside" and "the downside" of a proposal to privatize Social Security);
Laura Meckler, Bill Clinton Says He Should Have Tried to Regulate Derivatives, WASH. WIRE
(Apr. 18, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/04/18/bill-clinton-says-he-should-
have-tried-to-regulate-derivatives/ (recalling advice given to the President that complex financial
instruments need not be regulated because of predictability: only a small number of Wall Street
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One think tank that pursues tort reform with wit and gusto has de-
clared that tort liability for personal injury "erodes the risk-taking and
personal responsibility essential to our free society." 7 2 This claim ex-
tols uncertain outcomes (which "risk-taking" always entails) as
healthy for consumers, sellers, and the public. Liability, which the tort
reform movement has long lambasted as a source of dangerous unpre-
dictability,73 is also attacked for imposing rigid predictability on peo-
ple who want to be free.
C. Predictability and Unpredictability for the Two Sectors
The tort reform movement that gained strength at the end of the
twentieth century sheds light on the pro-plaintiff reforms of preceding
decades, as summarized in Part II. More overtly than the pro-plaintiff
expansion of tort remedies, pro-defendant tort reformers made rhe-
torical use of predictability. Their movement linked unpredictability
with actuarial chaos that in turn will reliably threaten the supply of
social goods. Predictability in this perspective becomes a cure: when
businesses and professionals (especially physicians) know just what a
liability regime can and cannot do to them, they regain their lost confi-
dence and re-engage with consumers. The unpredictability of tort lia-
bility harmed the quality of life for everyone, tort reformers argued;
reining in doctrine would enhance welfare.
Substituting partisan security and freedom for predictability and un-
predictability in this summary, we can alter the formulation slightly in
a direction that makes this description more accurate. Pro-defendant
reformers deplore the threat to their security and freedom that liabil-
ity poses. Personal injury claims can not only bankrupt a business;
they also can make life unpleasant for its managers, shift public opin-
ion about an entire sector in a negative direction, and stir up enough
outrage to generate new statutes and regulations. Trimming liability
professionals buy them, the advice went, and all these buyers are too sophisticated to need
protection).
72. CENTER POR LEGAL POLICY AT THE MANHAITAN INSTITUTE, http://www.manhattan-insti-
tute.org/html/clp.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). A few sentences later comes an expression of
ambivalence about at least one kind of money-making effort:
The Center for Legal Policy is committed to chronicling how trial attorneys in the
United States collectively behave just like the biggest of businesses: generating cash
from traditional profit centers (like asbestos), exploring potential growth markets (like
suits against lead paint manufacturers), and developing new products (like suits against
the fast-food industry).
I elaborate on this odd distaste for entrepreneurial hustle expressed by defenders of business
interests in Anita Bernstein, The Enterprise of Liability, 39 VAL. U. L. Rt'v. 27 (2004).
73. See supra Part Ill.A.
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liberates the defendant cohort; these individuals and entities can pur-
sue their goals with less worry.
I have already noted the inversion of this security-and-freedom par-
adigm for the opposing cohort.7 4 Tort liability shelters the plaintiff
camp from risks attributable to tortious conduct. As seen by the pro-
plaintiff group, liability fosters safety by encouraging defendants and
would-be defendants to reduce risks and then forcing them to provide
compensation when these risks materialize.7 5  Individuals become
freer in the sense that they need not retreat as much from engagement
with goods and services that could hurt them.76
"Your security is my lack of freedom and my freedom is your lack
of security,"77 the cohorts say to each other, in effect, when they pur-
port to install the ideal of predictability and constrain the deplored
unpredictability. A zero-sum impasse results. Policymakers must con-
sider alternatives to predictability and unpredictability in these rhetor-
ical forms that advocates have favored, substituting attention to what
people really want from a liability system-security and freedom-at
a supra-partisan plane.
IV. ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO SECURITY AND FREEDOM FOR
TORT REFORMERS
The "supra-partisan plane" calls for a modification to our 2x2 ma-
trix. Part II considered predictability and unpredictability in tort re-
form from the vantage point of plaintiffs; Part III considered them
from the vantage point of defendants, showing how unpredictability
arguments helped to sell tort reform to state legislatures, state judges,
the general public, and, to a lesser extent, Congress.78 Unpredictabil-
ity has been a useful partisan instrument to only one of the two camps.
Although predictability rhetoric could be deployed to benefit the
plaintiff group, this camp has not lately availed itself of such an appli-
cation. 79 References to unpredictability in the last several decades
74. See supra Part II.
75. This reasoning informed the pro-plaintiff reformism of Justice Roger Traynor when he sat
on the California Supreme Court. See George Priest, Economics of Civil Justice Reform Propos-
als, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. Pot'y 401, 405 (2000) (observing that in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Co., Traynor sought to impose a safety-and-insurance
scheme on product manufacturers).
76. See Fennell, supra note 19, at 1415-17.
77. On whether security and freedom are zero-sum goods, see supra notes 4-5 and accompa-
nying text.
78. See supra Part III.B.
79. See Bernstein, supra note 40, at 646 (reporting a relatively rare example of predictability
used by the pro-plaintiff camp).
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have been used to take away gains from the plaintiff side that accreted
in the mid-twentieth century. The plaintiff cohort has forfeited some
of the predictability that comes from enlarged liability.
Once the partisan goals are understood as security and freedom,
with predictability just a means to these ends, the supra-partisan ver-
sion of the matrix can remove predictability from the axis and substi-
tute what the two cohorts want: security and freedom for themselves.
Concerns about predictability may remain, but they can be included
under security; security for persons includes a degree of predictability
with respect to the behavior of other people.
With the matrix modified, the next question for policymakers be-
comes what uses to make of it, and here predictability as tort reform-
ers have invoked the concept-that is, predictability with respect to
the potentially disruptive behaviors of persons who claim they were
injured-is pertinent. Any legal system that has recognized the value
of predictability for one camp in a binary struggle must admit that the
other cohort also values this quality. Forfeiting the security that had
been rooted in liability is, from the plaintiffs' point of view, a loss.80 A
balance has been altered. In general, unless a group that forfeited
security had started out with too much of it, that group now has a
claim in distributive justice to gain more security, through alternative
reforms, that would adjust for what it lost.8 ' How much more may be
debated. But at a minimum, policymakers concerned about predict-
ability/security ought to extend this good to more than one cohort.
Concerning the risk of accidental physical injury that individuals
face, the three security-enhancing measures that have received the
most attention in current American discourses are first, universal
health insurance untethered to the employment relationship; second,
safety regulation by administrative agencies (in contrast to regulation
done indirectly through tort liability); and third, changes to workers'
compensation aimed at enhancing redress for employment-related
physical harm.82 I broach these proposals for the sake of discussion,
80. See John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of
Tort Retrenchment, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Riv. 1021, 1027 (2005) (arguing that the defendant cohort
had no entitlement to the gains it won by tort reform, because earlier pro-plaintiff shifts in
doctrine had repaired "two centuries of law favorable" to elite interests).
81. On distributive justice as justifying and explaining tort liability rules, see TSACHI KE RE N-
PAz, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRI3UTIVE JusTIcu 84 (2007). Welfare-based arguments
might support the same alternative reforms, although the rationale for their installation would
not take the form of a partisan claim by a cohort.
82. The order follows the quantity of space that each proposal has occupied in public discus-
sion. The second is the most law-focused of the three and it takes up the most room within legal
scholarship.
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not to advocate them. Tort reforms of the past that profited business
interests do not necessarily establish entitlement to any of these mea-
sures as a fix or offset for plaintiffs. The three possibilities discussed
below do, however, warrant consideration within a liability system
that lately has been reforming to augment security-through-predict-
ability for only one half of a partisan divide.
A. Health Insurance Untethered to Employment
Legislation enacted in early 2010 and scheduled at the time to go
into effect incrementally over the next four years extended health in-
surance coverage to millions of Americans who had lacked it.83 The
expansions installed some distance between employment and health
insurance. 84 More people became eligible for Medicaid, for example,
and "exchanges," or government-supervised markets, were an-
nounced as a way for other persons to buy health insurance policies.85
New prohibitions on discrimination against applicants with pre-ex-
isting medical conditions function, ceteris parabus, to make it easier
for persons with employer-furnished health insurance to leave their
jobs.
Left mostly undisturbed in the 2010 reforms, however, was a vener-
able American link. To a larger extent than any other nation, the
United States has established both health insurance coverage and the
partial payment of health insurance premiums as employment prac-
tices. World War II-era wage controls set the link in place. By ex-
empting fringe benefits from the wage category, employers were
encouraged to compensate workers with this insurance as a way to
retain their labor.86 Today, American tax law continues to underwrite
this benefit by making premium payments a deductible expense for
83. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a year-by-year sequence of provisions to take
effect in the future, see Landmark Legislation Historic Health Bill Passes Reform Timeline:
When Changes Take Effect, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 22, 2010, at Al.
84. This expansion continued a trend. See Daniel Gross, The Private Option, SLArlE (Sept. 10,
2009, 4:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2227984/ (reporting Census data showing that "health
insurance became less tethered to work" in 2008; the percentage of people covered by employ-
ment-based health insurance fell by almost one percentage point from 2007 and the percentage
of full-time and part-time workers who received health insurance through their jobs fell).
85. See Peter Grier, Health Care Reform Bill 101: How Long Will Reform Take?, CHRISTIAN
Sc. MoNIroR, Mar. 20, 2010, at 6 (describing expansion of Medicaid). Utah has one of these
exchanges in effect, though at the time of this writing it is still fledgling. See UTAii HEALTH
EXCHANGE, www.exchange.utah.gov (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
86. Bruce Shutan, Starting from Scratch, EMP. BENEITr NEws, Nov. 2009, at 38, 38.
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employers and exempting work-furnished health insurance from em-
ployees' taxable income.87
The result is unfortunate, as economists and other commentators
from across the political spectrum have agreed.88 In the 2008 presi-
dential election, the Republican nominee, John McCain, included in
his platform a plank to remove the tax subsidy for employer-furnished
health insurance.89 A noted Democrat has also favored untethering:
"Think of employer-provided health care as a kind of back-door, $126
billion-a-year health insurance system," wrote Robert Reich, the for-
mer Secretary of Labor.90 "But what a bizarre system it is. First,
you're not eligible for it when you and your family are likely to need it
the most . .. ."9' In 2009, the Business Roundtable, an organization
comprised of CEOs devoted to pursuing pro-business policies, pub-
lished a reiteration of the familiar complaint that employer-furnished
health care imposes a burden on American industry that is unfair be-
cause international competitor businesses do not share it.92
Although the three proposals surveyed in this Part focus on security
rather than freedom, separating health insurance from employment is
noteworthy in that it would foster both, assuming that health insur-
ance would be furnished by some other means after being untethered
from work. The platform of candidate John McCain, mentioned
above, offered uncoupling in the form of a tax credit for individuals to
purchase insurance on their own in place of the government-subsi-
dized group health insurance benefit that many receive through
work.93 This suggestion, which would have done little to advance "se-
curity," went nowhere, and post-2008 discussions of health care re-
form have taken for granted the necessity of a government subsidy in
order to expand coverage. With this understanding in place, security
87. See id.; Dayna Bowen Matthew, The "Race Card" and Reforming American Health Insur-
ance, 14 CONN. INs. L.J. 435, 437 (2008).
88. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance,
2 YAuE J. HEALTH PoL'y L. & EFFtHcs 23, 23 (2001) ("Employment-based health insurance is
the Rodney Dangerfield of health policy: it gets no respect from anyone.").
89. Kevin Sack & Michael Cooper, McCain Health Plan Could Mean Higher Tax, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 1, 2008, at A22.
90. Robert B. Reich, Why We Should De-Couple Health Care from Employment, COMMON-
DREAMS.ORG (Nov. 18, 2005), http://www.commondreams.org/views05/1118-27.htm.
91. Id.
92. Business Roundtable, Health Care Value Comparability Study (2009), available at http://
www.businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/BRT%20exec%20sum%20FINAL%20FOR%20
PRINT.pdf [hereinafter Business Roundtable]. On the familiarity of the complaint, see supra
note 69 and accompanying text.
93. See Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, An Analysis of the McCain Health Care Proposal,
URBAN INSTITUTE HEALTH POLICY CENTER (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.urban.org/Uploaded
PDF/411755_mccain-health-proposal.pdf.
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and freedom increase when governments intervene to disconnect
health insurance from employment. Again, the 2x2 matrix is
instructive:
FIGURE 4: FURNISHING HEALTH INSURANCE SEPARATE FROM THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Pro-Defendant
z
Pro-Plaintiff
Freedom Security
FREEDOM AND SECURITY
Filling in the squares of the matrix helps to answer a basic question
about health care reform: Why have tort reform leaders, especially
ones in the Business Roundtable category of corporate CEOs, gener-
ally declined to express any desire for universal health insurance?
Surely it would be advantageous for repeat-player defendants to in-
stall a scheme in which injured people would get their medical bills
covered without resorting to litigation. The partisanship axis dividing
the players into two cohorts sheds light on the mystery by noting that
the pro-defendant camp would not wish to furnish the pro-plaintiff
camp with more security and freedom. 94 The pro-plaintiff "freedom"
box on the matrix, which mentions the freedom of a discontented
94. See Adams, supra note 5 and accompanying text. Dr. David Himmelstein, co-founder of
Physicians for a National Health Program, participated in a forum sponsored by the Business
Roundtable where a moderator asked the audience, consisting mostly of representatives of big
business, which approach to health care reform they favored. Russell Mokhiber, The Top 10
Enemies of Single-Payer, CoUriERPUNCH (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/
mokhiber04162009.html. The majority raised their hands for government-sponsored single
payer. Id. Asked to explain the discrepancy, Himmelstein mused, "In private, they support
single payer, but they're also thinking-if you can take away someone else's business-the insur-
ance companies' business-you can take away mine. Also, if workers go on strike, I want them
to lose their health insurance." Id.
Lower per-employee Less needfor injured
payroll costs mean wider people to find a solvent
opportunities to spend defendant to pay their
revenue medical bills should
reduce liability exposure,
ti Ia Japan and Western
Europe
Employment at will, so to Confidence that medical
speak: no need to cling to expenses will be covered
an undesirablejob regardless of
(unpredictable)
circumstances
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worker to quit her job without worrying about her health insurance,
identifies a state of affairs that might displease the employer cohort.95
Consistent with this hypothesis, when an alliance of employers gave
its own ideas for reform at the end of its report about unfeasibly high
insurance costs, it set out to write a recommendation that "builds
upon the employer-based health insurance system." 96 Why choose to
build upon something so ruinously expensive to oneself? Similarly,
the Campaign for Responsible Health Reform, an initiative of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, has described itself as "a grassroots cam-
paign to educate businesses and citizens about the need for meaning-
ful and affordable health reform that protects employer-sponsored
health insurance"; the initiative also purports to "show[] what's at risk
with government-run health care and other dangerous proposals."97
Neither measure from the business sector gives reasons for this appar-
ent dislike of a reform idea that would enhance security and freedom
for this constituency. Partisanship as delineated in our 2x2 matrix-
including the perception of one's security and freedom as binary and
zero-sum-offers an explanation of the stance.
B. Administrative Regulation
Of the three suggestions presented in this Part, strengthening regu-
lation98 in order to take over some of the work that liability now han-
dles has received the most attention from legal scholars and judges.99
95. The principal-agent problem, though not so named, is noticed by Jonathan Gruber, A
Shot in the Arm, WASH. MowioHv, May-June 2009, at A14, available at http://www.washington
monthly.com/features/2009/0905.gruber.html ("[T]he workers [employers] retain through job
lock are those who value insurance the most, not necessarily those who are the best long-term fit
for the company.").
96. Business Roundtable, supra note 92, at 10. The ideas emphasize employer control: for
example, according to the report, "[W]e must encourage all Americans to participate in em-
ployer- or community-based prevention, wellness and chronic care programs." Id. at 11. The
recommendation of "empowering consumers with more information about good quality health
care," id., does not indicate whether these consumers are employees, dependent family members
who are covered under employer-furnished policies, or human resources personnel who buy
coverage for a company.
97. CAMPAIGN IFOR RESroNsimon, HEALTH REFORM, http://www.responsiblehealthreform.
com/campaign (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) (emphasis added).
98. 1 use "regulation" here as shorthand for rules prepared and enforced by administrative
agencies, excluding the big literature on "regulation through litigation." See generally REGULA-
TiON THROUGH LrrIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002); Ronald J. Rychlak et al., Regulation
Through Litigation, 71 Miss. L.J. 613 (2001).
99. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1027 (1990); Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability, 88
GEo. L.J. 2049 (2000). A more recent contribution is A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1437 (2010). In another recent work,
Kyle Logue favors a tripartite contrast: (1) tort liability, (2) "command-and-control regulations"
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This literature, which speaks of "institutional competence,"' 00 pits
regulation by administrative agencies against liability as policy alter-
natives; the two are rival candidates for the same security-and-free-
dom job. Each can displace the other.10 As approaches to the costs
of accidents, regulation and litigation pose stark contrasts: ex ante ver-
sus ex post; prevention versus remediation; expert assessment versus
lay power; agencies versus courts; the virtue of spelled-out criteria on
one hand versus after-the-fact reparative effort on the other.
For this purpose, examples of regulation as an alternative to liability
may be classified following a scheme adopted in a model statute that a
tort reform group has offered: this scheme employs a continuum
showing how thoroughly regulations eliminate tort remedies.102 The
Price-Anderson Act illustrates liability-eliminationist regulation.103
This federal statute imposes "absolute displacement" of state tort law
for injuries resulting from civilian nuclear power' 04 concurrent with
intricate safety regulation by a federal agency, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. At the other end of the displacement spectrum is the
rule that compliance with safety statutes alone ordinarily does not
(what I am calling simply "regulation" here), and (3) "Pigovian taxes." Kyle D. Logue, Coordi-
nating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZo L. Riv. 2313 (2010). 1 pass over his third category, which
seems to exist mainly in academic writing; for my purposes it is not different enough from regu-
lation simpliciter.
100. The term is neutral on its face, but in application tends to reference the relative incompe-
tence of courts. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Remedies When Contracts Lack Consent: Autonomy
and Institutional Competence, 33 OsGooDE HALL L.J. 209 (1995) (exploring settings where pri-
vate actors are better suited to understand the terms of a contract); Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution
of the Legal Process School's "Institutional Competence" Theme: Unintended Consequences for
Environmental Law, 33 EcolooGY L.Q. 1045, 1051-52 (2006) (arguing that "institutional compe-
tence" as applied silences courts, the public, and Congress).
101. This Article, which treats liability as central and regulation as an alternative, inverts the
analysis that a regulation scholar would apply to displacement. See, e.g., Andrew McFee Thomp-
son, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia, and
Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329, 1363-64 (1996) (arguing that tort reform might have merit
but would be perilous "if existing environmental statutes are seriously weakened and the U.S. is
forced to rely solely on the common law actions of private individuals for environmental
protection").
102. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., The Impact of Federal & State Safety Regulations on Liabil-
ity, THE STATE FACIOR, June 2009, at 1, 1-2 (describing the American Legislative Exchange
Council's Model Regulatory Compliance Congruity with Liability Act; this model statute offers
states three versions of regulatory-compliance shelter from liability to choose from).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006).
104. Logue, supra note 99, at 2334. Logue includes workers' compensation among his exam-
ples of absolute displacement. Id. I discuss workers' compensation separately, see infra Part
IV.C, rather than here because workers' compensation does not relate so closely to workplace
safety regulation as does Price-Anderson immunity to Nuclear Regulatory Commission
regulation.
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constitute a defense to tort liability. 05 In the middle are regulations
interpreted by courts to preempt tort liability to varying degrees.
Strong examples of preemption, located near the absolute-displace-
ment end of the spectrum, include compliance with federal labeling
law by cigarette sellers, which expressly preempts failure to warn
claims by consumers injured by tobacco, 106 and compliance with fed-
eral speed limits by railroads, which can immunize the railroads from
liability for moving their trains too fast and causing injury.107 Weaker
instances of preemption emerge when different courts disagree about
the tort-precluding effects of compliance with a particular federal reg-
ulation.1 08 Located nearby on the spectrum-nearer to no-displace-
ment than absolute displacement-are regulations where compliance
creates a rebuttable presumption against a finding of negligence or
product defect. 109
This variety within administrative regulations renders two spaces on
our matrix variable depending on the content of the regulation in
question. Administrative rules whose compliance immunizes a sup-
plier or service provider from liability generate much security for the
defendant cohort and a correspondingly large drop in the freedom of
the plaintiff group. Where regulatory compliance does not immunize
the regulated industry from liability, the plaintiff group retains or
gains more freedom than it would hold under conditions of industry
immunity. Regulations whose compliance has no effect on liability-
the standard tort rule-maximize plaintiff freedom and, if enforced,
greatly increase security for this group:
105. See RESTATEMENT (TFHRD) OF TOlRS: LIABIIy FOR PiYsIcA. HARM § 16 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005); Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in
Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. Rev. 1121, 1135-36 (1988).
106. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
107. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
108. See Anita Bernstein, Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. RFv. 669, 690-91 (2009)
(reporting decisional law that finds both a presence and an absence of preemption in the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act).
109. See Logue, supra note 99, at 2339 n.57 (citing eight state statutes that provide for this
rebuttable presumption following compliance with a federal or state standard).
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FIGURE 5: STRENGTHENING REGULATION
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Freedom
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FREEDOM AND SECURITY
Similar to filling in the squares of the health insurance matrix, 1 0
arraying regulation and litigation inside our 2x2 matrix provides a use-
ful reminder of plaintiffs' stake in the discussion. It is no accident that
the tort-displacement axis as a device to classify regulations comes
from the defense camp:111 the displacement perspective inquires into
the presence of security and freedom, but only as just one of the two
cohorts experiences these goods. Focused on only defendants as deci-
sion makers and stakeholders, this stance on regulation is indifferent
to the desire for security and freedom that plaintiffs hold.112
110. See supra Figure 4.
111. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
112. See Alan Calnan & Andrew E. Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey
of Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 67 TENN. L. REv. 177, 304 (1999) (noting that
while preemption doctrine "attempts to accommodate the regulatory interests of the state and
federal governments, it makes no provision for the economic welfare of the victims of exempt
products or services"). Consider the following analogy: the traditional categories of trespasser,
licensee, and invitee divide visitors to land into three hierarchical categories, based on what the
defendant thinks of them. Tort law offers no comparable classifications that invite plaintiffs to
divide defendants into groups based on what plaintiffs think of them. As I have elaborated
elsewhere, tort liability rules manifest empathy or-in the words of Adam Smith-fellow-feeling
for cohorts of plaintiffs and defendants. See Bernstein, supra note 46, at 297.
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The lower left quadrant of the matrix notes the effect of displace-
ment on freedom for the plaintiff cohort: plaintiffs are freer when they
may bring tort claims and less free when they may not. The lower
right quadrant appreciates regulation as a source of safety for consum-
ers.113 In sum, the matrix provides balance for the discussion about
liability and regulation by noting the stakes for a cohort that has its
own desires for security and freedom. This group will as a general
rule want safety rules and tort liability to coexist with neither regime
preempting the other. Like the interests of defendants that have dom-
inated discussions about the intersection of regulation and tort liabil-
ity, the interests of plaintiffs warrant attention.
C. Workers' Compensation
More than a century ago, a durable reform increased predictability
and security among the two cohorts of workers and employers-a
group that overlaps significantly with this Article's cohorts of plaintiffs
and defendants-while taking away some freedom from both. Under
what has been described as a Progressive-era "bargain" that mediated
between the two groups' interests, 114 employers gained the predict-
ability of insurance in contrast to the unpredictability of tort liability;
employees gained the predictability of scheduled payments for inju-
ries in contrast to the unpredictability of adjudication. While bestow-
ing these gains, the installation of workers' compensation also took
away various prerogatives: the opportunity to apply blame and fault,
access to a jury, and the complementary freedoms present in defenses,
excuses, impleading, cross-claiming, and other forms of responses to
accusations that litigants enjoy in court. For both sides, the freedoms
of tort liability take time to exercise; removing those freedoms offered
the prospect of payments that were faster and surer than tort judg-
ments, thus benefiting workers, and easier to budget and plan for, thus
benefiting employers.
113. On the truism that regulation enhances consumer safety, see Polinsky & Shavell, supra
note 99, at 1440-41. For a suggestion that linking regulation with safety might be simplistic, see
Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 Nw. U. L.
REv. CoiioQuy 54, 61-62 (2008) (arguing that patients can be better off under a regime that
preempts the tort liability of drug manufacturers because this regime assigns decision-making
powers to physicians who can make informed decisions of whether to use the drug).
114. The notion of workers' compensation as a bargain between two sectors is explored in
Jason M. Solomon, Note, Fulfilling the Bargain: How the Science of Ergonomics Can Inform the
Laws of Workers' Compensation, 101 Cot um. L. Rnv. 1140, 1144-46 (2001). Like other dichot-
omies in this Article, this "bargain" between employers and workers simplifies a more complex
history. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Re-
form," 50 RuTGroERs L. REv. 657, 675-76 (1998).
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The quality of the bargain may have been harmed at an early stage,
when some state supreme courts struck down workers' compensation
schemes as violative of substantive due process rights. These courts
agreed with employers that forcing a defendant to pay for injuries
without having been adjudicated at fault constituted a taking of prop-
erty without due process in violation of the federal and state constitu-
tions.'15 Most decisional law of the era went the other way,'16 but the
early setbacks cast a chill: "[T]he very fear of unconstitutionality im-
pelled the legislatures to pass over the ideal type of coverage." 17
Legislative timorousness may have weakened these programs from
their start.
One treatise summarizes the provisions of a typical contemporary
workers' compensation statute. In exchange for the loss of their right
to pursue a tort claim, workers injured by accident in the course of
employment are entitled to receive "modest but assured benefits,"118
which "include cash-wage benefits, usually around one-half to two-
thirds of the employee's average weekly wage, and hospital, medical
and rehabilitation expenses."" 9 Although considerable variation ex-
ists among the state statutes, claimants are universally spared the obli-
gation to prove employer fault, and their payments are not reduced or
vitiated by their comparative negligence or assumption of risk.
Observers of these programs have published litanies of criticism,
much of it deeming workers' compensation inadequate to remedy the
physical harms that employees experience on the job. They have pro-
posed legislative modifications that would increase both the amounts
paid out per worker and the odds of prevailing on a claim. Back we
go to the matrix.120 Which enhancements of security and freedom
emerge when these changes go into effect?
115. The torts casebook that I used as a student opened with the notorious Ives v. South
Buffalo Railway Co., 94 N.E. 431, 448 (N.Y. 1911), which invalidated the nation's first
mandatory workers' compensation scheme. See also Cunningham v. Nw. Improvement Co., 119
P. 554, 566 (Mont. 1911) (invalidating mandatory workers' compensation for railroad workers).
116. See Katherine V.W. Stone, A Fatal Mismatch: Employer-Centric Benefits in a Boundary-
less World, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. Rrev. 451, 457 (2007).
117. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 2.07 (2009).
118. Id. § 1.01.
119. Id.
120. The binary is complicated here by multiplicity among defendants: the cohort includes
both employers enjoying the tort-immunity gain of the bargain on one side and manufacturers of
machines used in workplaces, a group that does not share in this immunity and is subject to
products-liability claims, on the other. Yet when workers' compensation returns provide ample
compensation for injured employees, these injured employees have less incentive to invest in
products-liability litigation, suggesting that gains to security and freedom apply to both halves of
the defendant cohort.
2011] 301
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 6: ENHANCINGWORKERS' COMPENSATION
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FREEDOM AND SECURITY
Here the working definition of "enhancing workers' compensation"
means better compensation for injured workers, continuing the notion
of a bargain between the two sectors. Ways to make workers better
off include state-mandated increases in coverage for particular types
of injuries, increased payouts per injury that can be funded in part by
state tax revenues (rather than employer-paid premiums), and nar-
rowing the defenses available to employers who dispute coverage. All
of these changes would increase security for plaintiff workers.121 Re-
forms like these adjust for the loss of tort remedies by giving workers
more advantages within this insuiance scheme. The original bargain
had left workers better off than they now stand.
My provisional endorsement of reform ideas that industry would
find costly arises at a difficult time to make such a proposal: as this
Article goes to press, a period of severe economic distress continues
to afflict the United States.122 Industries employing workers in injury-
121. But see KENNEIHI S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABIIT1Y CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW
FROM THE PROGREssive ERA TO 9/11, at 59-60 (2008) (reviewing data suggesting that increasing
the cost of workers' compensation premiums may depress wages).
122. For a snapshot of the employment side of this depression in place at the time of writing,
see U.S. BUREAU OF- LABOR STATISTICs, EMPLOYMENT SIrUATION SUMMARY (2010), available
at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm. Improvement of the national economy is cer-
tainly possible, perhaps even likely. It may render my misgivings obsolete. Economists and
sociologists surveying the United States labor market, however, have predicted bleakness for the
foreseeable future, especially on the employment front. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGI. OFF.ICE,
TIE BUDGET AN) ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FiscAL YEARs 2009 To 2019, at 3 (2009), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9957/01-07-Outlook.pdf; Katherine Newman & David
Pedulla, Inequality in America and What To Do About It, TiH NATION, July 2010, at 17 (report-
ing predictions by sociologists that young people, the most recent entrants into the workforce,
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prone jobs continue the decline that has long plagued this sector.123
With white-collar employment having dwindled as well,124 the injury-
prone sector grows even more vulnerable because its members have
less access to alternative types of jobs. These dire employment condi-
tions might get worse if workers' compensation were to become more
costly on a per-employee basis.125
In recognition of this difficulty, another iteration of our matrix can
clarify the task of making recommendations: How can particular re-
forms enhance the freedom and security of industry as well as that of
workers? We have already noted that workers' compensation, when
understood in the context of a wider liability regime, benefits defend-
ants. Compensation by insurance rather than litigation has a plausible
connection to reduced labor-and-employment strife, freeing up mana-
gerial time and money and allowing these resources to be deployed to
be spent in pursuit of the business's interests. This freedom, like other
freedoms for defendants surveyed in this Article, can be understood
as security in the form of shelter from litigation. 126 We have also con-
sidered the parallel forms of security and freedom for workers.'27
With workers' compensation understood as a fixture, which reforms
would enhance the security and freedom it offers? Behold the matrix
again, with all of its boxes left blank for now except the obvious one:
will be especially scarred by their early experiences in a dire labor market); Don Peck, How a
New Jobless Era Will Transform America, TimE ATLANric, Mar. 2010, at 42 ("The Great Reces-
sion may be over, but this era of high joblessness is probably just beginning.").
123. See generally WI LIAM JuIus WIlSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE- WORD OF Tus
New URBAN POOR (1996) (documenting the disappearance of robust blue-collar employment).
More recently, construction has been hard hit. See Paul Davidson, Construction Unemployment
Stillon Rise, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2010, at 3B (reporting in the winter of 2010 that the construc-
tion industry was in its worst straits since the Great Depression); Construction Employment Falls
to 14-Year Low in June, FORCONSTRucrIONPROS.COM (July 6, 2010, 10:20 AM), http://www.for
constructionpros.comlonline/Construction-News/Construction-Employment-Falls-to-14-Year-
Low-in-June/4FCP16825 (reporting an unemployment rate over twenty percent, more than
double the average for all workers, in June 2010). Meanwhile, the recession also saw the loss of
nearly 2.2 million factory jobs. Davidson, supra, at 3B.
124. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsrics, supra note 122 (reporting large unemployment
levels).
125. See ABRAHAM, supra note 121, at 59-60 (warning that workers pay for high workers'
compensation costs).
126. See supra Figure 6, first row.
127. See supra Figure 6, second row.
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FIGURE 7: WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORMS: MOVING BEYOND
JUST PAYING Our MORE?
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FREEDOM AND SECURITY
Fidelity to the century-old scheme and to the principle of an im-
posed "bargain" requires fair and reliable compensation for injured
workers. Lawmakers ought to remember the historical promise to
these workers: more security gained and access to tort litigation lost.
The reform suggestions noted above in the lower right quadrant
would keep the old promise in mind by increasing the funds available
and the odds of collecting an award; the literature on workers' com-
pensation agrees that such rectification is necessary.
Now, what else? Consider the other quadrants: (1) freedom for
plaintiffs, (2) freedom for defendants, and (3) security for defendants.
Both scholarly and popular writing on workers' compensation is re-
plete with reform proposals; readers who find the security-and-free-
dom template pertinent might find it useful to apply as a sorting
device. Evaluating reforms in the context of security and freedom for
plaintiffs and defendants is a way for non-experts in workers' compen-
sation who come to the subject from a torts background to join, and
perhaps contribute to, an urgent discussion about the problem of
workplace injury. Consider some current proposals to improve the
law, administration, and delivery of workers' compensation. 128 Sev-
eral fall into quadrants other than the most familiar one, security for
plaintiffs.
1. Freedom for Plaintiffs
The most fundamental source of freedom for injured workers would
be the reinstatement of tort liability for injury-a partial rather than a
128. I acknowledge with gratitude the help of Tyler Korff on this work of retrieval and
synthesis.
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total reinstatement, so that workers' compensation as insurance would
still exist. As noted above in the context of regulation and litigation,
access to courts gives plaintiffs a freedom symmetrically matched to
the security that tort immunity gives defendants. If the literature con-
tending that the tort immunity present in workers' compensation com-
bined with the inadequacy of payments that injured workers receive
constitutes a breach of the Progressive-era bargain is correct, then
paying out more is only one of two solutions; opening the courts
would provide another rectification.
Workers' compensation immunity already contains several judge-
made exceptions. They include liability for intentional torts, injuries
arising under the employer's "dual capacity" (i.e., the injury resulted
from an interaction between the worker and the employer outside the
employment relationship), and bad faith. 1 2 9 Expanding tort liability
without eliminating the bar could enhance freedom for plaintiffs in
several directions. For example, courts could provide a tort remedy
for workers discharged from employment for complaining about
safety violations.13 0 The Americans with Disabilities Act could be in-
terpreted to expand access to courts by injured workers.' 3 1  Courts
could classify more plaintiffs as independent contractors or other non-
employees, freeing them from the tort immunity that employers en-
joy. 3 2 They could also expand judicial review of workers' compensa-
tion decisions.
2. Freedom for Defendants
The workers' compensation reform proposal that most overtly ex-
pands freedom for defendants is mandating or expanding considera-
tion of the workplace history in the setting of insurance premium
129. Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield & Robert W. Klein, The New Relationship Between
Injured Worker and Employer: An Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. Bus. L.J.
403, 410-14 (1998).
130. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 Cot um. L. Riiv. 319, 394-95 (2005).
131. See Gabel, Mansfield & Klein, supra note 129, at 414-22 (reporting on this expansion
with disapproval).
132. See, e.g., Rachel Cartier, Comment, California Farm Owner Liability for Heat-Related
Injuries to Their Independent Farm Labor Contractor's Farm Worker Employees, 19 SAN JoA-
oUIN AGRIC. L. Ri.v. 93 (2009) (reviewing the controversy); Maria de Cesare, Note, Rxxx:
Resolving the Problem of Performer Health and Safety in the Adult Film Industry, 79 S. CAL. L.
Rev. 667, 692-96 (2006) (advocating that adult film performers be permitted to pursue tort
claims for work-related transmission of disease). For a variation on the independent contractor
theme in this context, see Steve P. Calandrillo, Sports Medicine Conflicts: Team Physicians vs.
Athlete-Patients, 50 Si. Louis L.J. 185, 204-05 (2005) (proposing that professional athletes who
play team sports be treated for workplace injuries by physicians who do not work for the teams,
thereby removing the workers' compensation bar and installing deterrence).
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prices. This measure, known as experience rating, frees employers to
decide how much they want to invest in safety.' 33 Like most interven-
tions that affect freedom, experience rating also affects security, but
not in the zero-sum sense that has occupied this Article. Deployed by
providers of workers' compensation insurance, experience rating is
said to have reduced "workplace fatalities by more than 25%."134
Consistent with a hypothesis about moral hazard, the absence of expe-
rience rating endangers workers: "When premiums have not been
fully experience-rated, employers have been less prone to provide a
safe work environment ... ."'35 Experience rating is already the norm
in workers' compensation insurance markets, but governments could
create more of it by mandating the collection of pertinent experiences
in industry and making the rating calculations more transparent.
3. Security for Defendants
To fill in the content of this last square, policymakers must supply
reforms that bestow predictability on employers. At this point we are
familiar with defendants as seekers of security: this Article has shown
how predictability in the tort reform context-the rewriting of tort
liability rules, that is, rather than the insurance scheme that this sec-
tion considers-has consisted of moves toward immunity. The cohort
links predictability with shelter (for itself) from tort liability. Work-
ers' compensation, however, already delivers to them this good. Un-
like tort reform, reforms of workers' compensation that would make
injured persons less entitled to receive compensation for workplace
injury has no plausible association with predictability outside of this
partisan cohort.136 Although experience rating imposes responsibility
133. Note, Fixing Medical Malpractice Through Health Insurer Enterprise Liability, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 1192, 1195 (2008) (praising this freedom for its deterrence value).
134. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REv. 227, 281 (2008).
135. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evi-
dence, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 53, 79 (1998). But see Solomon, supra note 114, at 1177 n.112 ("[T]he
empirical evidence regarding the success of experience rating as a prevention tool is mixed.").
136. Predictability in the context of trying to anticipate what will reduce workers' compensa-
tion payouts-by analogy to the quest for predictability in liability reform, see supra Part
III.A-is elusive, at least when I am doing the predicting. For example, undocumented alien
workers comprise a relatively easy group of workers to disempower through harsh applications
of workers' compensation law. See J. Tim Query, Workers' Compensation for Undocumented
Workers: A Discussion of the Regulatory Complexities, J. INs. REG. 1, 6 (2006), available at http://
business.nmsu.edu/~tquery/research/WorkersE2%80%99%20Compensation% 2 0for%2 OUn-
documented%20Workers-A %20Discussion%20of%20the%20Regulatory%20Complexities.pdf
(referring to "[a] [v]ulnerable and [e]xploited [w]orkforce"). Yet even this weak sector installs
predictability of several kinds. First, one might expect undocumented workers not to seek com-
pensation payments when they get hurt on the job. Many probably live up to that prediction, but
one survey reports a robust case law, suggesting that an employer cannot assume that hiring
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for accidents on employers, it does so in a setting of insurance rather
than liability.
In this context, security for the defense sector comes from workers'
compensation reforms that make the actuarial future of an employer
easier to predict. Many possibilities are available for consideration.
The level of detail that they include extends past the scope of this
Article; and so I briefly note two current examples of reforms that
would enhance security for defendants. To repeat my contention that
both of the partisan cohorts of this Article are similarly situated-that
predictability is not just a defense-side tort reform priority-I have
chosen one reform from the conservative side of contemporary Amer-
ican politics and the other from the liberal wing.
One aspect of security for defendants is clarity about the scope of
the scheme: Which injuries and workers are covered? Who has the
power to resolve disputed claims? Consider new legislation enacted
in a conservative state. Recent comprehensive reform had the osten-
sible goals of helping to "grow Oklahoma's economy while still pro-
tecting the injured worker and helping them on their road to
recovery," as the speaker of the state house of representatives put
undocumented workers will eliminate its workers' compensation payouts. See Marjorie A.
Shields, Annotation, Application of Workers' Compensation Laws to Illegal Aliens, 121 A.L.R.
5'Ti 523 (2004) (reporting case law and statutes that both permit and refuse this coverage). I also
would have predicted that regardless of whether undocumented alien employees in fact wish to
make compensation claims, several states would have codified a prohibition on their doing so;
such a ban would please the immigrant-unfriendly segment of the electorate without inconve-
niencing employers in the mode of other controls on illegal immigration, especially restrictions
on hiring. But I found only one state prohibition. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-102 (2009) ("An
alien who is not authorized to work by the United States . .. is not an 'employee' under (a)(vii),
and thus is excluded from workers compensation coverage."). The majority of states explicitly
cover "aliens" in their workers' compensation statutes. National Employment Law Project, Un-
documented Workers: Preserving Rights and Remedies After Hoffman Plastic Compounds v.
NLRB (unpublished manuscript), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/b378145245dde2e58dOqm6i6i
6g.pdf. Finally, I predicted that courts would be more supportive than legislatures of undocu-
mented workers, another wrong (or at best incomplete) assumption. For example, the Virginia
legislature overruled a state supreme court decision that had held these workers ineligible. See
VA. CooE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Supp. 2007). In New York and California, courts have deemed
undocumented workers ineligible for workers' compensation even though state statutes ex-
pressly cover these workers. See Ramroop v. Flexo-Craft Printing, Inc., 896 N.E.2d 69, 72 (N.Y.
2008) (ruling against an employee notwithstanding the inclusion of undocumented workers in
N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. L. § 17); Foodmaker, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 78 Cal. Rptr.
2d 767, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling against an employee notwithstanding the inclusion of
undocumented workers in CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351). Even assuming that employers are better
than I at predicting, which seems likely, and know how to reduce their payouts for workplace
injury, gains from this predictability do not extend past this cohort. The costs of these accidents
fall on injured workers and the public.
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it.137 Touted as likely to "save businesses at least $60.5 million" a
year,138 the four reform bills in the legislative package tightened the
definitions of such key phrases as "major cause" and "objective medi-
cal evidence," raised the minimum credentials of workers' compensa-
tion judges, and provided for enhanced training of claims adjusters.139
Although most of the changes functioned to reduce benefits available
to injured workers, the Oklahoma reform also expanded judicial re-
view of disputed claims. If it succeeds, this undertaking would en-
hance the common law of workers' compensation disputes.
Employers gain security from the clarity of knowing how recurring
disagreements between employers and workers are resolved.
Another aspect of security for defendants returns us to the first pro-
posal of this Part: health insurance untethered to employment.140 In
a 2009 white paper on workers' compensation reform, the American
Public Health Association (the APHA) advocated replacement of the
current "fragmented" regime with "a national program with uniform
coverage of health care and adequate loss-of-earnings benefits for all
occupational injuries and illnesses."141 Going further, the APHA
called for integrating workers' compensation "in a seamless manner
with the Social Security disability program; benefits should be pro-
vided for all permanent injuries and illnesses."1 42
This proposal finds security for defendants in an alternative regime
that separates them from responsibility to pay for injuries associated
with their worksites. Knowing that a remote compensation scheme
will take care of claims that are now charged to employers under an
experience-rating system furnishes these defendants with security.
The unpredictability and uncertainty that characterize employer-
funded insurance for workplace injury would be greatly mitigated by a
universal health and disability program that the federal government
would administer. Employers might have their own reasons to prefer
their current vexations, to be sure.143 But they would enjoy more se-
137. Michael McNutt, Henry OKs Workers' Comp Bill, Ttle OKLAHOMAN, June 12, 2010, at
20A (quoting House Speaker Chris Benge).
138. Oklahoma: Overhaul of Comp System Complete, Heads to Governor, RISK & INS. ON.
LINE (June 28, 2010), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyld=464485608.
139. McNutt, supra note 137, at 20A.
140. See supra Part IV.A.
141. Worker's Compensation Reform, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTCH AND SAErFy SECION OF THE
AMERICAN PuMuc HEAli T AssocArtoN (Draft 2009), available at http://www.apha.orgfNR/
rdonlyres/B240302E-94EF-4456-966F-6AEF329C289E/0/WorkersCompDraftNov102009.pdf.
The report is unpaginated; the quote appears on the sixth page.
142. Id. at 7.
143. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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curity if they did not have to buy insurance to compensate their em-
ployees for workplace injury.
V. CONCLUSION
"To all appearances, lawyers abhor uncertainty," declared one au-
thority on predictability and unpredictability. 14 4 "They learn in law
school to seek out the certain and object to its absence. As practition-
ers, they shun the unpredictable, counseling settlement rather than
trial and avoidance of that allegedly least predictable of decision mak-
ers-the jury."1 45  No doubt. Like many other writers, I have also
had occasion to remark on risk aversion as an occupational trait of
lawyers' 46 and began this Article with a quick paean to predictability
as necessary to human life. Yet my paean to unpredictability had to
follow immediately-just as lawyers themselves, the predictability
fans, have been heard to call for more unpredictability. 147
In this version of the predictability-unpredictability binary, the two
words make the most sense as instruments, the means to divergent
ends. What do we talk about when we talk about unpredictability and
predictability? 148 This Article has argued that pleas for more predict-
ability amount to pleas for more security. These law reformers want
to feel safe from external onslaughts. Human beings desire control
over the threatening aspects of their environments. When they them-
selves are controlled, however, typically they will feel chafed.
144. Clifford Symposium, supra note 56.
145. Id.
146. See Anita Bernstein, Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Training of Lawyers, 94 Con-
NE L L. REv. 479, 500-01 (2009).
147. The jurisprudential struggle between rules and standards finds value in the less predict-
able latter category. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudica-
tion, 89 HAlRv. L. Rev. 1685, 1701-02, 1710-11 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 57-58 (1992). Another famed dichotomy
of jurisprudence, the hedgehog versus the fox, locates value in not being sure of "one big thing."
See Martha Minow & Joseph William Singer, In Favor of Foxes: Pluralism as Fact and Aid to the
Pursuit of Justice, 90 B.U. L. REV. 903, 919 (2010) ("Pluralism presents the possibility that one
may be in the wrong. The preservation of the losing opinion confronts the winner with the
presence of the loser. Rather than a triumphant presentation of a neat, consistent case, plural-
ism reminds winners that they may need to rethink, concede, or change."). In the torts context,
some defenses of punitive damages rest on a belief that adding (unpredictable) juries as decision
makers adds a desirable in terrorem effect to what defendants face in response to their miscon-
duct. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards:
"Morals Without Technique"?, 60 FLA. L. REv. 349, 360 (2008) (approving of "necessary vague-
ness"); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implica-
tions for Reform, 50 Busii.. L. REV. 103, 108 (2002) (considering the possibility of randomness).
Uncertainty may also be necessary to deterrence. See Clifford Symposium, supra note 56.
148. Cf. Anita Bernstein, Foreword: What We Talk About When We Talk About Workplace
Privacy, 66 LA. L. REv. 923 (2006).
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Examining predictability and unpredictability as rhetorical instru-
ments rather than goals in themselves shows that what their invokers
care about is security for themselves via some shelter that does not
compromise or abrogate their freedom. Partisans wish to maximize
their own shares of these goods. In the tort reform context, the most
striking evidence for this proposition comes from the historical em-
braces of predictability by persons who sought advantages for plain-
tiffs and of unpredictability by persons who sought advantages for
defendants.149 Neither cohort has taken a consistent stance on
predictability.
Once predictability and unpredictability become transparent as de-
vices, the next question for policymakers is how to use them to
achieve valuable ends. In its ideal form, this quest proceeds on what I
have called a supra-partisan plane: that is, taking into account the
needs of two cohorts with contrary interests without being bound to
advance their agendas. Policymakers are free to relocate predictabil-
ity and unpredictability beyond the existing battlegrounds chosen to
achieve cohort-favoring ends. For defense-focused tort reformers,
predictability might mean immunity or caps on damages; to their
counterparts in the other camp, it might underlie support for continu-
ing unfettered access to the courts. Law reformers independent of
both camps might apply the word to health insurance untethered to
employment, stronger administrative regulation, and more reliable
workers' compensation.' 50 I have mentioned these three measures
not to play a game of Gotcha with defense-favoring tort reform advo-
cates who have invoked predictability with great vehemence, but
rather to say that the pursuit of predictability has been indeterminate
and partial.
Many calls for more predictability in tort doctrine should be heard
and understood as "I desire more security for myself and the cohort to
which I belong, and I don't wish to forfeit my freedom."15 Resis-
tance to these calls for more predictability comes from another set of
stakeholders' mirror-desire to maximize its own freedom and security.
Disinterested tort policymakers respond to the paired demands by
seeking the greatest social good in a balance. Their balancing task is
enhanced by an understanding of what a predictability-pleader really
wants.
149. See supra Parts II, Ill.
150. See supra Part IV.
151. Not all, however. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (giving examples of
pleas for predictability that do not originate in zero-sum partisan struggles).
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